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Abstract: The collapse of the clearinghouse for the entry-level gastroenterology labor 
market  offers  a  unique  opportunity  to  study  the  failures  that  sometimes  afflict  such 
markets.  
To  explore  the  reasons  for  the  failure  of  the  clearinghouse,  we  conduct  an 
experimental  investigation  of  demand  shocks  of  the  kind  that  occurred  in  the 
gastroenterology market.  We find that a reduction in demand for positions leads to the 
collapse  of  the  match  only  when  it  is  detectable  by  firms  before  being  detected  by 
workers, as in the unexpected shock that took place in 1996, which could be seen by 
firms in their reduced applicant pools.  Simple demand and supply imbalances do not 
seem to interfere with the operation of the centralized match. 
Our results suggest that the market failed when applicants lost their ability to discern 
when they should reject an early, exploding offer.  This suggests that the failure of the 
gastroenterology  clearinghouse  is  related  to  the  unraveling  also  seen  in  a  number  of 
decentralized markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Many entry-level labor markets (and quite a few other markets) have at some point in 
their history suffered from the "unraveling" of hiring decisions. Unraveling is typically a dynamic 
process, in which offers are made earlier from year to year, and can come to be written quite far 
before  actual  employment  starts.  In  markets  that  experience  unraveling,  applicants  typically 
receive “exploding” offers that must be accepted or rejected before other offers can be received 
and considered. The causes of this market failure are however still not well understood.
 1 
In many markets there have been vigorous and sustained efforts to halt the unraveling of 
appointment  dates.  Efforts  to  simply  impose  uniform  appointment  dates,  without  any  market 
structure to support them, have most often been unsuccessful. Some markets have successfully 
reorganized themselves around a centralized clearinghouse, which permits matching at a uniform, 
efficient time (Roth and Xing 1994).
2 
Not  all  centralized  clearinghouses  have  been  successful.    There  is  a  good  deal  of 
empirical evidence (see e.g. Roth 1984, 1991, Roth and Xing 1994) that a key element of the 
design of a successful clearinghouse is whether it produces matches that are stable in the sense 
that there exists no firm and worker who are not matched to one another but who would both 
prefer  to  be  matched  to  one  another  rather  than  accepting  the  results  of  the  centralized 
clearinghouse  (cf.  Gale  and  Shapley,  1962,  Roth  and  Sotomayor,  1990).
3      However,  some 
unstable matching mechanisms have been observed to persist for years (cf. Roth, 1991), and a 
very few stable matching mechanisms have been observed to fail.
4 
  We  know  of  about  100  markets  and  submarkets  organized  by  a  stable  matching 
mechanism (often called simply a “match), but we know of only a handful in which a stable 
match was abandoned after operating successfully for several years. The gastroenterology market 
is the only one of these for which we have been able to gather evidence that suggests that the 
demise of the match is primarily related to events within the market itself.  It therefore provides 
us with a unique opportunity to investigate why a stable centralized mechanism failed, while so 
many others continue to be successfully used.  
                                                           
1 Roth and Xing, 1994, describe several dozen such markets and submarkets.  Two markets that have 
recently been experiencing this kind of unraveling are the market for law clerks for Federal appellate 
judges (cf. Avery, Jolls, Posner and Roth 2001), in which offers have been made almost two years in 
advance of employment, and the market for college admissions (cf. Avery, Fairbanks and Zeckhauser 
2003), in which elite colleges admit a high percentage of their entering classes "early decision.".   
2 For possible effects of a match on wages, see Niederle and Roth (2003a).  
3 This is a bit of an oversimplification.  Many labor markets have special features that complicate the 
definition of stability: see e.g. Roth and Peranson, 1999. 
4 In theory, stability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the success of a match (see Roth 
and Xing, 1994, Li and Rosen, 1998, Li and Suen, 2000, and Suen, 2000).    2
This is an issue of considerable interest to market designers who are asked to consider 
how and when stable clearinghouses may improve market performance.
5  While it seems clear 
that centralized matches that produce unstable outcomes have been unsuccessful in organizing 
markets, we do not know when stable matches are successful. Understanding this will help us 
understand which other markets that currently do not have a centralized match may be able to 
successfully introduce a match, and which of the markets that now have a successful match may 
be prone to fail, and what could be done to help them. Finally, understanding the failure of a 
centralized match, and hence better understanding environments in which a centralized match 
succeeds, may also help us understand how decentralized markets of this kind clear, or fail to. 
 To  address  the  reasons  for  the  market  failure  in  the  gastroenterology  market,  after 
considering the history of the market prior to the collapse of the match, we will turn to laboratory 
experiments. The available field data, while suggesting hypotheses about the cause of the collapse 
(some  of  them  put  forward  by  market  participants),  do  not  allow  these  hypotheses  to  be 
distinguished, because they are all consistent with the history of the market.  Experiments in the 
laboratory allow us to reproduce and vary on a small scale different conditions of supply and 
demand, and the kind of shocks experienced by the gastroenterology labor market just prior to the 
collapse of the match, in ways that the single observation of the history of the market cannot.  
 
2. The Gastroenterology Market 
  The history of the market for GI fellowships (so called because of the older name of 
Gastro-Intestinal disease) is similar to that of many medical labor markets (Roth, 1984, Roth and 
Xing, 1994). Before 1985, it suffered from the unraveling of appointment dates, and a number of 
solutions were attempted prior to the adoption of a centralized match (cf. Gerson, 1999).  In 1986 
the  Medical  Specialties  Matching  Program  (MSMP)  was  initiated  to  establish  a  uniform 
appointment  date  and  permit  applicants  to  complete  at  least  two  years  of  residency  before 
deciding which sub-specialty to pursue. The fellowship clearinghouse was conducted a year in 
advance, i.e. after two years of internal medicine residency, and one year before employment 
                                                           
5 Understanding under what conditions stable matches succeed is of lively interest in several  contemporary 
design  efforts.    In  New  York  City,  the  Department  of  Education  initiated  a  stable  match  for  the 
approximately 100,000 middle school graduates who entered high school in September 2004.  In Boston, a 
study of the existing, unstable matching system is presently underway, with the goal of recommending 
design changes.  (In this connection, see Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez 2003.)  And a recent anti-trust suit 
against the National Resident Matching Program prompted new legislation clarifying that such a match 
does not violate antitrust laws (Public Law 2004), and raised questions about how possible modifications in 
the match would change the performance of the market (cf Bulow and Levin, 2004, Crawford, 2004).     3
would begin (NRMP 1999). Applicants and fellowship programs submitted rank order lists of 
positions and applicants, respectively, that are processed to produce a stable match. 
However, after 1996 the centralized match broke down and was abandoned. In 1996 
around 300 positions participated in the match, by 1999 there were only 14, and in 2000 no 
centralized match for gastroenterologists was even attempted.  
The  demise  of  the  match  seems  to  have  been  set  in  motion  in  1993-1994,  when 
Gastroenterology  subjected  itself  to  a  manpower  analysis  (Meyer  et  al  1996).  Its  main 
conclusions were that the US health care system and gastroenterologists would benefit from a 
reduction  in  gastroenterology  fellowship  programs.  The  Gastroenterology  Leadership  Council 
endorsed a goal of 25% to 50% reduction in the number of GI fellows over 5 years. Furthermore, 
an additional year of training was mandated: starting in the summer of 1996, three years of 
training were required to be board eligible, instead of two.  
That  is,  in  1996  the  supply  of  gastroenterology  fellowships  was  sharply  reduced,  by 
administrative decision, and the time needed to become a gastroenterologist was increased by a 
year  (although  some  three-year  fellowship  programs  existed  before  1996).    However,  this 
announced (and hence expected) reduction in supply triggered an even larger reduction in the 
number of residents who applied for GI fellowships. This seems to have been the start of the 
demise of the match. In 1996, for the first time, and despite the reduction in the number of 
positions  offered,  there  were  fewer  applicants  for  GI  fellowship  positions  than  there  were 
positions  offered  in  the  match.    That  is,  despite  the  considerable  reduction  in  the  supply  of 
positions, the market experienced a shortage in demand for positions, as residents stayed away 
from the market. This seems to have triggered a scramble among fellowship programs (see e.g. 
Gerson, 1999). Once the match broke down, and the commitment to uniform late appointment 
dates vanished, the market for gastroenterology fellows once again experienced unraveling and 
exploding offers (cf. Bauer et al 1999).   
One hypothesis about what caused the demise of the gastroenterology match, put forward 
by market participants in the gastroenterology literature, is that a centralized match can only work 
when there is a surplus of applicants (cf. Gorelick, 1999, Toskes, 1999). 
Of course, there may be different kinds of perceived shortages of applicants. There may 
simply be fewer applicants than positions, as in 1996. A more subtle kind of shortage is that there 
may  not  be  enough  “high  quality”  applicants  to  fill  the  high  quality  positions.  Indeed,  the 
perception among some GI fellowship directors is that, even though there are now once again 
more applicants than positions, there are not enough high quality applicants available. Of course, 
such perceived shortages can also arise in the eyes of applicants, regardless of the number of   4
positions available.  In many markets there appears to be a perception among participants on both 
sides  of  the  market  that  they  are  on  the  long  side  (i.e.  there  are  never  enough  high  quality 
opportunities on the other side of the market, cf. Toskes, 1998). 
  The matching algorithm used by the NRMP to conduct the medical matches generates a 
stable outcome regardless of any shortages of positions or applicants. However, the incentives for 
programs and applicants to participate in the centralized match, or strike a deal outside the match, 
may change in response to changes in supply and demand. 
  Before we present further hypotheses about the demise of the GI match, we first need to 
consider the difference in the strategic options facing firms (fellowship programs) and applicants. 
Two asymmetries seem particularly important in the present instance:  
1.  Asymmetry of actions:  In both centralized and decentralized markets, applicants apply to 
firms  to  be  considered  for  a  position  (e.g.  apply for  an  interview).    In  decentralized 
markets, or when firms do not wait for a centralized market, firms then make offers, and 
applicants decide whether to accept or reject them. 
2.  Asymmetry of information following a shock: Receipt of applications gives firms an 
informational advantage; they know if they are getting many or few applications, and 
hence they have an early indication of shifts in the demand for positions.  In contrast, 
information about the supply of positions is common to both firms and applicants, since 
available  positions  are  announced  well  in  advance.  And  in  the  absence  of  a  shock, 
historical information will be a reliable guide to both firms and applicants. 
This  suggests  three  related  hypotheses  about  why  the  shortage  of  applicants  for 
gastroenterology positions in 1996 set off the collapse of the match. Each is a special case of the 
previous hypothesis.  
1.  The success of this kind of match depends on there being more applicants than positions: 
the centralized match fails when there are fewer applicants. 
2.  The match failed because there was a shock that reduced the demand for positions below 
the supply, but the match could have recovered from this shock if given the chance, once 
supply and demand stabilized. 
3.  The match failed because there was a shock that reduced the demand for positions below 
the supply, and because firms knew this (because they could see their reduced applicant 
pool) and applicants didn't. However, the match could have recovered from this shock if 
given the chance, once supply and demand stabilized, since then applicants would no 
longer be at an information disadvantage to firms.    5
While all three hypotheses take as their basis the fact that the gastroenterology match 
started to unravel the first year in which demand for positions was less than supply, they differ in 
their implications for a reorganization of the gastro match, for what we should expect to find in 
other markets with and without successful centralized clearinghouses, and for how such supply 
and demand shocks might be managed in the future. 
 
3. Experiments 
We  create  a  simple  matching  environment,  in  which  to  study  the  effects  of  both 
stationary imbalances in supply and demand, and of shocks that create a shortage of applicants.  
In  each  experimental  condition,  subjects  first  gain  experience  of  unraveling  by 
participating in fifteen decentralized markets.  They then participate in fifteen markets in which 
centralized matching is available to subjects who choose to wait and use it.  In the treatments that 
involve a shock, the shock occurs after the 30
th market, and subjects participate in an additional 
15 markets after the shock, with centralized matching available for those who wait to use it.  (We 
use single shocks that reverse imbalance between demand and supply of positions, such as we 
observed in the market for gastroenterology fellowship positions.)  Firms and applicants are both 
always  fully  informed  about  the  number  and  types  of  firms  in  the  market.    We  vary  the 
information that applicants have about other applicants, and examine markets either with full 
information, in which firms and applicants have the same information about supply and demand, 
or partial information, in which only firms are directly informed about the number of applicants.  
(The partial information condition is intended to let us observe the market in conditions like that 
of the 1996 shock to the gastro market, which unexpectedly reduced the number of applicants.)  
 
The Environment
6 
   Participants in the experiment are assigned the role of either a firm or a worker (i.e. an 
applicant for work), of one of two types, High or Low. Each subject maintained the same role 
(e.g.  as  a  High  firm)  throughout  all  the  markets  in  an  experimental  session,  and  no  subject 
participated in more than one session.
7 In each market, firms can match to at most one worker, 
                                                           
6 Our environment is similar to the experimental environment in Kagel and Roth (2000), with some small 
procedural changes.  So our results prior to the introduction of shocks serve to replicate their results and 
add confidence that they are not the artifact of some of the specific procedural choices. The imbalances in 
demand and supply and the shocks that are the subject of this experiment are unlike the treatments in prior 
experiments. 
7 In the gastroenterology market, like other entry level labor markets, only employers tend to participate in 
many markets.  However, applicants have many opportunities to learn from and about the experience of   6
and each worker can match to at most one firm. For each participant, a match to a High type is 
worth 150 points plus or minus a private value between 0 and 10 points. A match to a Low type is 
worth 50 points plus or minus a private value between 0 and 10 points.  Participants know other 
participants’ types, but not their private values (although each participant knows his own private 
values for others). 
Markets are divided into three periods, and in each period, firms that are not yet matched 
can make up to one offer. After all the firms make offers (or choose not to make an offer), 
workers accept or reject offers. An offer contains the type and an identification of the firm that 
made that offer. A worker who receives several offers only sees them one at the time, in a random 
order. That is, these are “exploding” offers, a worker must choose to accept or reject each offer 
without knowing whether he has any more offers coming in that period.  Workers can only accept 
one offer per market. Accepted offers are announced to all participants in any subsequent periods, 
while unaccepted offers remain private.  Matched firms are no longer allowed to make offers and 
unmatched firms cannot make offers to matched workers.   
In the gastroenterology labor market, costs of unraveling consist of many components for 
both firms and workers, including uncertainty about the quality of the match and loss of planning 
flexibility. In our experiment, we model these various costs simply, by imposing a fixed cost of 
contracting early (as in Kagel and Roth, 2000).  In particular, each market lasts for 3 periods, 
denoted periods -2, -1 and 0. To model costs of unraveling each participant who matches in 
period –2 incurs a cost of 20 points and each participant who matches in period –1 incurs a cost 
of  10  points.  The  penalties  for  matching  early  are  deducted  from  the  participants’  earnings. 
Subjects who failed to match by the end of period 0 receive 0 points for that market.  Participants 
receive $.008 for each point plus a $10 show-up fee. 
  There are two kinds of markets: 
1.  In a decentralized market, firms have 3 periods to match by making offers to workers, 
who can accept or reject the offers.  
2.  In a centralized market, the first two periods are as in the decentralized market.  But in 
the last period, period 0, all firms and workers who have not already matched in periods  
-2 and -1 are matched at the firm-optimal stable matching.
8 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
previous years, from colleagues, advisors and publications. For simplicity, the present experimental design 
gives both sides of the market experience in the same way. 
8 When the MSMP operated the gastroenterology match, a version of the firm-optimal deferred acceptance 
algorithm was used.  For ongoing matches, the MSMP subsequently followed the NRMP in adopting the 
Roth-Peranson (1999) algorithm, built around an applicant-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm.     7
In each experimental treatment there are 3 low type firms and 3 low type workers. We 
vary the number of high type firms and workers to induce demand and supply imbalances and the 
kinds of demand shocks as experienced by the gastroenterology market.  
 
Fixed Demand treatments: 
To test for effects of demand and supply imbalances, we have 3 treatments, determined by the 
number of high type firms and workers. 3Firms – 3Workers is the treatment in which there are 3 
high type firms and 3 high type workers (in addition to the 3 low type firms and workers). We 
compare the outcome of the 4 sessions of this balanced treatment to the 7 sessions in which there 
is excess supply of workers (3 Workers – 2 Firms) and the 7 sessions in which there is an excess 
supply of firms (3Firms – 2Workers). In all three treatments, both firms and workers are informed 
about demand and supply, and participate in 15 decentralized markets followed by 15 centralized 
markets.
  
 
The Shock Treatments: 
The shock treatments started out with 3 High type firms and 4 High type workers. Then, 
after market 30, there was a single shock, eliminating 2 High type workers and hence resulting in 
a shortage of workers from markets 31 to 45.
 9 We ran 10 sessions of each of those treatments.
10 
  The shock conditions were conducted under one of two information conditions, Full or 
Partial information. (The conditions without a shock were all conducted under Full information.) 
In both information conditions, firms and workers are both fully informed about the number and 
quality  of  firms  in  the  market.  Firms  also  know  the  number  and  quality  of  workers.  The 
information condition affected whether workers know about the number and quality of workers. 
  
1.  Full Information:  Workers are fully informed about the number and types of workers in 
each market. So, when there is a shock that changes the number of workers, the workers  
know about the shock as soon as the firms do.    
2.  Partial Information:  Workers are not informed about the number and types of workers in 
each market. So, when there is a shock that changes the number of workers, only the 
                                                           
9 Under the Full Information design, the two workers who drop out after market 30 collect their payments 
and leave while the others finish the last 15 markets.  In the partial information condition, these two 
workers are told to remain quietly at their workstations so as not to signal to the other participants that they 
have been removed from the market. 
10 All fixed market sessions and 4 of each of the shock sessions were run in the winter and spring of 2001-
2002. 6 sessions of the shock treatments were run in the summer of 2003.   8
firms can see the shock at the start of the market. Workers only find out about other 
workers when early matches are made.
11   
 
Experimental Results: 
As  in  Kagel  and  Roth  (2000)  the  data  are  best  explained  by  examining  the  High  type 
participants,  since  Low  types  almost  universally  participate  in  the  centralized  match  once  it 
becomes  available.
12    To  filter  out  the  High-Low  or  Low-High  matches  that  occur  from  the 
imbalance of supply and demand, in each market we will look at the High types on the short side 
of the market.  That is we are concerned whether the maximal number of possible High-High 
matches are achieved in each market.  
Figure 1 graphs the percentage of High-to-High matches that are made late (i.e. in period 0). 
For the sessions that experienced shocks in the balance of supply and demand following market 
30, the figure shows how participation in the centralized clearinghouse reacted to the shock, in 
both the short term (markets 31-35), and over the longer term (markets 31-45) under the new 
post-shock conditions of worker shortage. 
To analyze the data, for each session we use averages over five markets (as in figure 1) as 
data points. To analyze differences within treatments, we use the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-
rank test, while we use the Mann Whitney test for differences across treatments. 
 
The effects of a centralized Match under constant market conditions 
For  all  5  treatments,  the  decentralized  market  exhibits  substantial  early  contracting. 
Furthermore, Markets 6-10 experience the same amount of late contracting as markets 11-15.  
For all 5 treatments, the introduction of the centralized match increases the percentage of 
matches that are made efficiently late: markets 16-20 are significantly different from markets 11-
15 in all treatments.
13 The success of the match is virtually the same across conditions.
14 
15 
                                                           
11 Accepted offers are made public, along with the type and identity of the firm and worker. 
12 Figures for the Low type participants, screen shots of the experimental conditions, and experimental 
instructions are found in McKinney, Niederle and Roth (2004) also available on the web at 
http://www.stanford.edu/~niederle/gastro.experiment.pdf .  
13 The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test comparing the proportion of late matching in markets 11-
15 with the proportion of late matching in markets 16-20 in the 10 pairs of each of the full and partial 
information  treatments  yields  p-values  of  0.04  and  0.01  respectively.  Similar  Wilcoxon  matched-pairs 
signed-rank tests yield p-values of 0.07 for the 4 pairs in the 3 Firms – 3 Workers treatment, 0.02 for the 7 
pairs in the 3 Firms – 2 Workers treatment and 0.03 for the 7 pairs in the 2 Firms and 3 Workers treatment. 
14  Comparing  the  percentage  of  late  matches  in  markets  26-30  across  all  conditions  using  the  Mann 
Whitney test we find p-values that are 0.4 or higher. 
15 For all the markets in which there are 3 possible matches between high type agents, the effectiveness of 
the centralized match increases as the participants gain experience with it: there is significantly more late 
matching in markets 26-30 than in markets 16-20. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests yield p-  9
Both  when  there  was  a  shortage  of  firms  and  when  there  was  a  shortage  of  workers,  a 
centralized market was effective in increasing the percentage of late matches. This increase in late 
matches is due to a somewhat more efficient period 0 matching mechanism, and mostly to a 
reduction in early matchings.
16 
There is no suggestion in the data that centralized matches work well only when supply and 
demand are balanced, or only when firms are on the short side of the market.  In each of the 
experimental  sessions  with  no  shocks  (or  before  the  shock),  the  centralized  match,  once 
introduced,  achieved  a  steady  rate  of  participation,  suggesting  that  it  is  robust  to  varying 
conditions of supply and demand.  Our results replicate and extend those of Kagel and Roth 2000 
to the current environment. 
The effect of the shock 
We are now in a position to consider the effect of the shock that changes the market from 
one in which workers are in excess supply to one in which they are in short supply, starting in 
market 31.  We have already seen that the centralized mechanism is widely adopted when it is 
available.  In  both  information  conditions  its  adoption  improves  efficiency,  resulting  in 
significantly higher total payoffs to firms and workers.
17 Prior to the shock there are no important 
differences between the two information treatments. 
18  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
values of less than 0.01 for both the full and partial information treatment, and yields p=0.07 for the 3Firms 
- 3Workers treatment. When there are only 2 high matches, the change is not significant, the p-values are 
0.102 and 0.369 respectively.  
16 Indeed, comparing the proportion of early matches in markets 26-30 with the proportion in markets 11-
15, a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test for the 10 pairs of the full and partial information treatments 
yields p-values of less than 0.01, for the 4 pairs of the 3Firms - 3Workers treatment the p-value is 0.068, for 
the 7 pairs of each the 2 Firms – 3 Workers and the 3 Firms - 2 Workers treatment the p-values are 0.022 
and 0.05 respectively. 
17 A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test comparing earnings in markets 16-20 with markets 11-15 in 
each  of  the  10  pairs  yields  values  of  p<0.01  for  both  the  full  information  treatment  and  the  partial 
information treatment. 
18 Mann-Whitney tests comparing the average proportion of late matching between the 10 sessions in each 
treatment, yield p-values of 0.44 for markets 11-15, the last decentralized markets, 0.49 for markets 16-20, 
the first centralized markets, and 0.84 for markets 26-30 the last centralized markets before the shock. 
Similar results are obtained when looking at the proportion of early matches. Furthermore, there are no 
differences in the changes in the proportion in late matchings between the full and the partial information 
treatment, for the introduction of the centralized match, (markets 16-20 minus markets 11-15), the increase 
in adoption of the match (markets 26-30 minus markets 16-20), and the difference in late matching between 
the  last  centralized  markets  and  the  last  decentralized  markets  (markets  26-30  minus  markets  11-15). 
Similar results hold for the proportion of early matches.   10
Late Matches (High Types on the Short Side)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1 to 5 6 to 10  11 to 15 16 to 20 21 to 25 26 to 30  31 to 35 36 to 40 41 to 45
Full information shock: 3 Firms, 4 Workers before and 2 Workers after the shock
Partial information shock: 3 Firms, 4 Workers before and 2 Workers after the shock
2 Firms - 3 Workers
3 Firms - 2 Workers
3 Firms - 3 Workers
decentralized centralized centralized (after shock)
Figure 1: Percentage of High Matches that are made in period 0. 
 
Following the shock that removes two High type workers, unraveling reoccurs in markets 
31-35 in both information conditions, but only marginally in the Full Information condition, and 
significantly in the Partial Information condition. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test 
that compares the proportion of late matches in markets 25-30 with that in markets 31-35 in the 
10 matched pairs of the partial information treatment yields a p-value of 0.01, and the test in the 
full information treatment  yields a p-value of 0.26.
19  
The  impact  of  the  shock  is  significantly  greater  in  the  partial  information  treatment.  
Participation in the centralized match falls by 9.3 percent under full information, and 30 percent 
under partial information when comparing markets 31-35 with markets 26-30. A Mann Whitney 
test confirms that the lack of information leads to significantly more unraveling (p<0.05). 
After the shock the amount of unraveling in the partial information treatment, 47% (in 
markets 31-35) is comparable to the one in decentralized market, 52% (in markets 11-15). A 
Wilcoxon  matched-pairs  signed-rank  test  delivers  a  p-value  of  0.33.  In  contrast,  under  full 
information there is nowhere near as much unraveling after the shock (24%) as there was in the   11
decentralized  markets  (55%):  a  Wilcoxon  matched-pairs  signed-rank  test  yields  a  p-value  of 
0.007.  Furthermore,  there  is  a  significant  treatment  effect,  that  is,  the  significant  change  of 
unraveling in the full information condition is significantly different from the (small) change in 
unraveling in the partial information condition. A Mann Whitney test on the differences in the 
proportion of early matches (n=20) delivers a p-value of 0.058, a significant effect. 
By the final 5 markets, markets 41-45, about 80% of the participants are again matching 
late (with in each treatment at least half the groups having 100% late matches).  That is, the effect 
of the shock, minor in the full information condition and much larger in the partial information 
condition, is transient in both conditions.  The effect of workers not having information about the 
number  of  other  workers  diminishes  as  they  gain  experience  of  markets  with  no  subsequent 
shocks in the number of workers. 
 To  understand  the  effect  of  the  shock,  and  why  it  affects  the  partial  information 
condition so much more than the full information condition, we look at the pattern of early offers 
by  high  quality  firms  to  high  quality  workers,  and  the  high  quality  workers’  acceptance  or 
rejection of these offers following the shock. We will see that, after the shock, when there is a 
shortage of High type workers, firms increase the number of early offers they make.  But the 
workers accept these offers much less frequently in the full information condition, in which they 
know they are now on the short side of the market, than in the partial information condition.   
Figure 2 shows the normalized percentage of High type workers who receive an offer 
from a High type firm, and the solid part of the bar shows the proportion that accept those offers. 
The percentages are normalized once again by the number of High type participants on the short 
side of the market, and also by the number of High type participants remaining on the market. 
That is we report the number of high type workers that receive an offer from a high type firm 
divided by the number of high type workers who could have received an offer from a high type 
firm, had all the (remaining) high type firms made offers to different high type workers. (The 
numerical percentage on top of the bar, and the height of the solid part of the bar, indicate the 
percentage of these offers that were accepted.) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
19 Whenever a centralized match is in place, there are virtually no high matches that fail to form, that is, the 
reduction in participation in the centralized match almost equals the increase of early matchings.   12
Figure 2: Offers, Acceptances, and Rejections  
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The percent on the vertical axis is normalized by the number of High type participants on the short side of 
the market, that are still available.  Thus, in markets 1-30, a bar of total height 100% in period –2 would 
imply that each of the three High firms made offers to a different High type worker. A bar of total height 
100% in period –1 or 0 implies that all remaining High type workers minus one (as High type workers are 
on the long side of the market) receive an offer from a High firm. (The numerical percentage on top of the 
bar, and the height of the solid part of the bar, indicate the percentage of these offers that were accepted.) 
After the shock, in markets 31-45, a total height of 100% in period -2 implies that both of the High type 
workers received at least one offer from a High firm. In period –1 or 0, a total height of 100% implies that 
each remaining High type worker received an offer from a High firm.  
Percent of workers 
accepting their offers. 
Percent of workers 
accepting their offers.   13
Behavior in the decentralized markets is not surprising.  In both treatments the firms are 
aware that they are in short supply, but to avoid congestion in period 0 a number of early offers 
are made and most are accepted. In markets 16-30, the centralized match solves the congestion 
problem and removes the incentives for high quality firms to make early offers to high quality 
applicants.  The number of such offers falls significantly.
20 The proportion of early (period 1) 
offers continues to fall as market participants become experienced with the centralized match.
21  
After the shock firms are now on the long side of the market and have incentives to make 
early offers to secure  a High type applicant. In both  treatments, offers in period -1 increase 
significantly, by 49 and 62 percentage points, for the complete and partial information treatment 
respectively (with Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank tests comparing separately in each of the 
10 pairs markets 26-30 with markets  31-35 yielding p-values below 0.01 in each case.) 
However, the reaction of applicants differs sharply between treatments. While firms have 
an incentive to make early offers to secure a high type applicant applicants now would do better 
not to accept such early offers. However, in the partial information treatment, applicants are 
unaware of this change: 55% of the workers accept offers made in period -1 in markets 31-35, 
compared to 32% under full information (the difference between the two information conditions 
is significant, the Mann Whitney test (n=20) yields a p-value = 0.0373.  
Overall, our experimental results show that a shock to the number of applicants that 
reverses the imbalance of supply and demand and makes applicants the short side of the market, 
like the one that the gastroenterology market experienced in 1996, can affect participation rates in 
the match.  The experiments show that this is particularly so when workers do not realize that 
they are, unexpectedly, on the short side of the market.  The results thus tend to support our third 
hypothesis, that the match failed because there was a shock that reduced the demand for positions 
below the supply, and because firms  knew this and applicants did not. (Recall how the low 
demand for positions in 1996 was an unexpected shock.) 
 
 
                                                           
20 The proportion of high quality applicants who receive an offer from a high quality firm in period -1 falls 
by 18 percent after the introduction of the centralized match (markets 16-20) in the complete information 
treatment, and by 22 in the partial information treatment compared to the average proportion over the last 
five markets before the match (markets 11-15). Both reductions are significant, a Wilcoxon matched-pairs 
signed-rank test on each of the 10 pairs yields p-values of 0.07 and 0.01 respectively. Comparing the 10 
pairs of markets 6-10 with 11-15, yields no significant effect (p>0.4) and only changes of 3 or 4 percentage 
points. 
21 From markets 16-20 to 26-30 (from the first five to the last five markets in the match before the shock), 
the proportion of early offers falls by 20 and 18 percent for the complete and partial information treatment 
respectively, a significant difference (p<0.01 with a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test).   14
4. Connections to other markets 
A  large  part  of  economics  is  devoted  to  investigating  what  markets  accomplish  at 
equilibrium.  But we know much less about the mechanics of how markets clear, or fail to.  This 
gap in what we know is particularly acute for markets, like labor markets, in which workers and 
jobs are heterogeneous, and so an offer is not just a price offered to the whole market, as in a 
financial or commodity market.  Market failures offer a window through which to investigate this 
process,  and  the  gastroenterology  market  offered  a  particularly  clean  transition  from  a  late, 
efficient market organization to one with early, dispersed offers.   
  In the laboratory, we can see that when matchings become early, they become inefficient, 
in that they don’t maximize the sum of participants’ welfare. And in the field data, Niederle and 
Roth  (2003b)  found  that  when  gastroenterology  fellowship  positions  were  offered  through  a 
centralized clearinghouse,
 the market became significantly more national than it was before the 
match,  or  since  its  demise.
  The  mobility  of  GI  fellows,  as  measured  by  whether  their  GI 
fellowship is in the same hospital, city or state as their former residency, significantly increased 
with the use of a centralized match.
 22  
For many markets (and marketplaces), the ability to achieve efficient gains from trade has 
to do with some aspect of the thickness of the market, of how many possible transactions can 
simultaneously be considered.  Dispersion of offers in time is one of the things that can diminish 
a market’s thickness, since agents on both sides of the market are faced with sequences of choices 
among very few alternatives.   
Our results suggest that markets unravel, and thickness is lost, when applicants lose their 
ability  to  reject  early  exploding  offers.    In  the  gastroenterology  market,  this  seems  to  have 
resulted from a situation that temporarily created incorrect beliefs about supply and demand.  
More generally, unraveling requires conditions in which there are both firms that want to make 
early offers and applicants who want to accept them. To create thickness, a market must be 
attractive enough so that participants want to wait to transact in it, and safe enough for them to do 
so.   
  This generalizes to other contemporary market failures as well.  The market in which 
federal appellate judges in the United States hire new graduates of top law schools as law clerks 
has also been afflicted with unraveling of appointment dates   In that market, applicants are 
strikingly reluctant to reject offers by federal judges who have interviewed them, and indeed it is 
sometimes an explicit condition for receiving an interview that an offer will be accepted if made 
                                                           
22  Frechette,  Roth,  and Unver  (2004)  show  using Nielsen  ratings of  college  football bowl  games  that 
unraveling caused inefficiencies in the early 1990s, that have been reduced by later matching.   15
(Avery, et al. 2001, Becker Breyer and Calabresi 1994.)  Much of the market for admission to 
elite undergraduate colleges has moved early in a similar way, with some colleges explicitly 
using  “binding  early  decision  programs”  that  favor  applicants  who  apply  early  to  only  one 
college, on the understanding that they will attend if accepted (Avery et al. 2003). In both of these 
markets, like the gastroenterology market, applicants are at least sometimes faced with early 
options that they may not hold and compare with other potential offers.   
  The results of the present experiment suggest the hypothesis that this ability to compare 
(and reject) offers may be one of the critical but fragile determinants of how well such markets 
clear. 
 
5. Conclusions 
  The results of the experiment suggest that the collapse of the gastroenterology match was 
related to the peculiar situation in which gastroenterology found itself in the late 1990’s. After a 
reduction in the number of gastroenterology positions, the market nevertheless suffered such a 
shortfall in applicants that applicants were in shorter supply than positions.  Not only did this give 
fellowship programs incentives to fill their positions early, it made applicants (who knew of the 
reduction in positions, but not of the shortage of well qualified applicants) eager to accept offers 
whenever they received them. 
The  results  of  the  experiment  also  suggest  why  failures  of  stable  matches  are  rare. 
Anticipated imbalances in supply and demand, visible to both sides of the market, did not cause 
declines  in  match  participation  of  anywhere  near  the  magnitude  caused  by  the  unanticipated 
shock that created a shortage of workers (that workers were initially unaware of). And while 
supply and demand shocks themselves may not be rare in these labor markets, shocks that change 
which is the short side of the market appear to be quite rare.  None of the other internal medicine 
subspecialty  matches  (Cardiovascular  Disease,  Pulmonary  Disease  and  Infectious  Disease) 
experienced such a shock.
23  
  Since the loss of the match, the number of positions has again stabilized, raising the 
question of whether this market might be able to successfully employ a match again. Our results 
suggest that a centralized match would once again be successful.  And reintroducing a centralized 
                                                           
23 From 1990 to 1998 the ratio of applicants to positions offered in the Cardiovascular match varied from a 
high of 1.6 to a low of 1.3.  For Pulmonary disease those ratios varied from a high of 1.5 to a low of 1.1, 
and for Infectious disease (from 1994 to 1998) those ratios vary from a low of .68 to a high of .92 (Niederle 
and Roth 2004).  Thus, unlike in the Gastroenterology market, the short side of these markets did not 
change, although in Infectious diseases the applicants were in short supply, and in the other matches the 
positions were in short supply. Our experiments provide an additional data point that markets in which   16
match would increase the scope of the market and the mobility of gastroenterologists, as well as 
allowing matches to be made after more information has become available. 
In  summary,  this  paper  exploits  a  rare  event—the  failure  of  the  stable  matching 
mechanism  used  to  organize  the  market  for  gastroenterologists—to  explore  how  such 
clearinghouses fail, and why failures are rare.   The fact that the failure of the gastroenterology 
match seems to have been the result of an unusual, one-time shock to the market, helps us to 
advise gastroenterologists that it appears that a reintroduction of the match would once again be 
successful.  And the fact that simpler shocks do not disrupt the operation of the match explains in 
part why this kind of clearinghouse has operated so successfully, over many years, in markets that 
have certainly experienced shocks in supply and demand. 
More generally, while theories of equilibrium do a good job of explaining what markets 
should do when they clear, we have few descriptions of how markets (especially those that are 
not  commodity  or  financial  markets)  do  clear.  The  results  of  the  experiment  reported  here 
underline the importance of those elements of the market environment that gave applicants the 
confidence to decline early offers. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
applicants are in short supply may be equally as stable as markets in which applicants are abundant, and 
that the success of the market for infectious disease fellowships is not an anomaly.   17
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